



FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20463

Trevor Potter, Esq.
General Counsel
John McCain 2008, Inc.
1235 South Clark Street, Suite M
Arlington, VA 22202

MAY 20 2009

RE: MUR 6023

John McCain 2008, Inc. and Joseph Schmuckler,
in his official capacity as treasurer

Dear Mr. Potter:

On June 16, 2008, the Federal Election Commission ("the Commission") notified you and your clients, John McCain 2008, Inc. and Joseph Schmuckler, in his official capacity as treasurer ("Committee"), of a complaint alleging violations of certain sections of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended. On May 19, 2009, the Commission found, on the basis of the information in the complaint and information provided by your clients, that there is no reason to believe that the Committee violated 2 U.S.C. §§ 434(b), 441a or 441b. Accordingly, the Commission closed its file in this matter.

Documents related to the case will be placed on the public record within 30 days. See Statement of Policy Regarding Disclosure of Closed Enforcement and Related Files, 68 Fed. Reg. 70,426 (Dec. 18, 2003). The Factual and Legal Analysis, which explains the Commission's finding, is enclosed for your information.

If you have any questions, please contact Ana Peña-Wallace, the attorney assigned to this matter at (202) 694-1650.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Peter G. Blumberg", with a long horizontal line extending to the right.

Peter G. Blumberg
Assistant General Counsel

Enclosure
Factual and Legal Analysis

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1 **FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION**

2 **FACTUAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS**

3
4 **RESPONDENT:** John McCain 2008, Inc. **MUR: 6023**
5 and Joseph Schmuckler,
6 in his official capacity as treasurer
7
8

9 **I. INTRODUCTION**

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11 This matter is based upon a complaint filed with the Federal Election Commission ("the
12 Commission") by David Donnelly, *see* 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(1), alleging that John McCain 2008,
13 Inc. and Joseph Schmuckler, in his official capacity as treasurer, ("McCain Committee") may
14 have received an excessive in-kind contribution from a lobbying firm and a prohibited corporate
15 contribution from an Internet consulting firm.¹ The complaint alleges that The Loeffler Group,
16 LLP ("LG") made payments to Susan Nelson, a former lobbyist who left LG to become the
17 McCain Committee's Finance Director, which amounted to undisclosed excessive in-kind
18 contributions to the McCain campaign. The complaint also alleges that 3eDC, LLC ("3eDC"),
19 an Internet consulting company partly owned by Rick Davis, McCain's campaign manager,
20 made a prohibited corporate contribution to the McCain campaign when it reduced the
21 campaign's debt to 3eDC by over \$100,000.

22 Based upon the available information, including written responses from the respondents
23 denying the allegations, there is no information to indicate that the respondents may have
24 committed the violations alleged in the complaint. Accordingly, the Commission finds no reason
25 to believe that John McCain 2008, Inc. and Joseph Schmuckler, in his official capacity as

¹ The complaint was based on information from a press report discussing lobbyist ties to the McCain campaign. Complaint at 1; Michael Isikoff, *McCain vs. Lobbyists*, NEWSWEEK, May 26, 2008, at 6.

treasurer, violated the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended ("the Act"), in connection with the allegations in this matter.

II. FACTUAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. THE LOEFFLER GROUP, LLP

1. Factual Background

Susan Nelson worked as a lobbyist for LG from August 2005 through July 2007, when she left to work full time as the Finance Director for the McCain campaign. See McCain Committee Response to Complaint ("McCain Response") at 1; Tory Newmyer & Kate Ackley, *K Street Files*, ROLL CALL, July 13, 2005. After she left LG, she continued to receive monthly payments from the firm in the amount of \$15,000 until April 2008. Isikoff, *supra* note 1, at 6. The complaint claims that the payments for alleged part-time consulting services "dwarfed [Nelson's] approximately \$6,300 monthly salary" for full-time work with the McCain committee. Complaint at 3. As such, the complaint questions whether LG actually made excessive in-kind contributions to the McCain campaign by paying such a large salary to Nelson for part-time work and whether Nelson, in fact, did any work for LG during this period.

According to information obtained by the Commission, from August through December 2007, LG's payments to Susan Nelson consisted of severance payments that were part of a severance agreement entered into with Nelson when she left the firm. That information indicates that these payments were commercially reasonable, as well as consistent with and pursuant to LG's pre-existing severance policy and practices. It appears that the severance payments were less than her previous full-time salary and "on terms in the ordinary course of [LG's] business" from August through December 2007. However, the amount of the monthly payments to Nelson or Nelson's previous full-time salary have not been verified. Based on information obtained by

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1 the Commission, it appears that during this time period, Nelson provided advisory services
2 directly to LG Chairman, Tom Loeffler and that he and Nelson may have had over 100
3 conversations regarding firm matters during that time.

4 After the severance period ended in December 2007, LG entered into a consulting
5 arrangement with Nelson for part-time work for which payments began in January 2008 in the
6 same amount as the severance payments. Information obtained by the Commission shows that
7 LG wanted to continue to consult with Nelson on various firm matters during this time, and
8 because the work would be similar to the work she performed during the severance period, the
9 parties agreed to payments in the same amount.

10 The McCain campaign states in its response that it was aware of both LG's 2007
11 severance package and the 2008 consulting agreement with Nelson, and that it had no objection
12 to Nelson working with LG on an "occasional basis provided that it did not interfere with any of
13 her work for the Campaign." McCain Response at 1-2. The McCain Committee explains that it
14 operated under the understanding that the payments were commercially reasonable and pursuant
15 to LG's policies. *Id.* at 1. The campaign instructed LG that any salary payments that Nelson
16 received from the firm pursuant to the 2008 consulting agreement "would have to be the usual
17 and normal rate paid for such work in order to comply with federal election law and
18 regulations," and the campaign reviewed the consulting agreement between Nelson and LG to
19 ensure that it addressed these concerns. *Id.* at 2. The McCain Committee, however, has not
20 provided a copy of this agreement to the Commission.

21 The arrangement between Nelson and LG ended in May 2008 when the McCain
22 campaign instituted a conflict of interest policy applicable to lobbyists that prohibited campaign
23 employees from being registered lobbyists. *Id.* at 2 and Exhibit A. As a result of the McCain

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Committee's new policy, Nelson left LG to work exclusively for the campaign, and LG de-listed her as a lobbyist in its 2007 Year End Reports filed pursuant to the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995. *Id.* at 4; *see* Loeffler Group's 2007 Year End Lobbying Reports, dated Feb. 14, 2008, available at http://www.senate.gov/legislative/Public_Disclosure/LDA_reports.htm.

2. Legal Analysis

The Act prohibits contributions to a candidate or authorized committee in excess of \$2,300 in connection with federal elections. 2 U.S.C. § 441a. The term "contribution" includes "any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office." 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A). LG is a limited liability partnership, and, as such, its contributions are permissible, subject to a \$2,300 contribution limit. 11 C.F.R. § 110.1 (b)(1) and (e). A contribution by a partnership is attributed to the partnership and to each partner "[i]n direct proportion to his or her share of the partnership profits" or according to the partners' profit-sharing agreement as long as "[o]nly the profits of the partners to whom the contribution is attributed are reduced (or losses increased)" and "[t]hese partners' profits are reduced (or losses increased) in proportion to the contribution attributed to each of them." *Id.* There are five partners listed on the firm's website, and four donated the maximum \$2,300 to McCain's primary election campaign.²

In the context of employment-related compensation, Commission regulations provide that payments from a third party to a candidate shall be considered a contribution unless the "compensation results from *bona fide* employment that is genuinely independent of the candidacy," "is exclusively in consideration of services provided by the employee as part of this employment," and "the compensation does not exceed the amount of compensation which would

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1 be paid to any other similarly qualified person for the same work over the same time period.”

2 See 11 C.F.R. § 113.1(g)(6)(iii). While this regulation applies to payments made to a candidate,
3 the provision nevertheless aids in the analysis of the payments made to Susan Nelson as it sets
4 forth standards by which to analyze compensation by third parties to highly-placed campaign
5 employees to determine whether the compensation results in a contribution to the campaign.

6 The Commission has, in past enforcement matters, determined that compensation did not
7 result in a contribution where the information available was consistent with the respondents'
8 contentions that the arrangements were for *bona fide* services performed, independent of the
9 candidacy, and did not exceed the compensation paid to similarly qualified persons. At the
10 reason to believe stage, the Commission has examined the complaint and responses, alongside
11 any publicly available information, in making this determination. For example, in MUR 5260
12 (Talent for Senate), the Commission found no reason to believe that violations occurred as result
13 of payments from a law firm and university to a candidate, where the information provided by
14 Respondents indicated that the payments were for *bona fide* employment, the candidate's high
15 public profile played a role in determining the amount of his compensation, there was no
16 indication to suggest that the compensation was for anything other than *bona fide* services, and
17 the evidence showed that compensation paid to Talent was comparable to compensation paid to
18 similarly qualified persons for the same work over the same period of time. MUR 5260, First
19 General Counsel's Report, dated December 19, 2002, at 16-23. In that matter, the Commission
20 noted that there was “an absence of any evidence tending to show that Arent Fox and Talent
21 entered into their arrangement with the intent to subsidize Talent's

² Commission records indicate that LG partners Michael P. Daniels, Robert H. Finney, Tom Loeffler, and Hans C. Rickhoff each contributed \$2,300 to the McCain Committee for the primary election.

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Senate campaign or exploratory efforts." *Id.* at 23.

Other matters review have required investigations into the criteria set forth in 11 C.F.R. § 113.1. In MUR 5014 (Jeff Flake for Congress), the Commission investigated whether payments made to a federal candidate by a non-profit organization were prohibited or excessive contributions under the Act. At the reason to believe stage, the available information raised questions about the amount of work the candidate performed, whether the amount of compensation paid to the candidate was commensurate with his work and whether it was comparable with what would be paid to another similarly qualified person, why the timing of the consulting agreement was to last only for the duration of the campaign, and whether the organization would have had sufficient funds to pay the candidate without a substantial donation made by the candidate's campaign co-finance chairman at that time the candidate was hired. After the investigation, the Commission determined there was insufficient evidence in that matter to support the alleged violations. Instead, the evidence suggested that there was a *bona fide* consulting agreement between the parties, the salary payments were made to the candidate only for services he rendered, and the amount of the candidate's compensation was commensurate with the amount paid to similarly qualified persons performing the same work. MUR 5014, General Counsel's Report # 2, dated October 3, 2003, at 5-18.

Similarly, in MUR 5571 (Tanonaka for Congress), the Commission authorized an investigation when information available at the reason to believe stage suggested that the candidate's receipt of a lump sum payment from Koa Companies was contrary to the terms of the consulting agreement and was paid at a time when his campaign committee's financial position was poor; the candidate concealed his business relationship with Koa until after state and federal agencies initiated investigations into his campaign activities; and the candidate engaged in a

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1 pattern of hiding the sources of funds used to make his personal loans to his campaign,
2 suggesting knowing and willful violations of the Act. See Factual and Legal Analysis for Dalton
3 Tanonaka and Tanonaka for Congress. However, the Commission found, after an investigation,
4 that there was a consulting agreement between Tanonaka and the Koa Companies for *bona fide*
5 consulting services, the agreement was independent of Tanonaka's candidacy, and that
6 compensation Tanonaka received was in consideration for services he performed for the
7 company and commensurate with the amount of money that would be paid to any similarly
8 qualified person for the same work over the same period of time. See MUR 5571, General
9 Counsel's Report # 2, dated September 20, 2007; *c.f.*, MUR 5638 (Bill Abbott For Preserving
10 American Jobs) (the Commission found reason to believe and entered into conciliation
11 agreement with union where Respondents admitted that payments to the candidate were not for
12 *bona fide* employment, genuinely independent of the candidacy, in consideration for services
13 provided, or equivalent to what would be paid to similarly situated employees).

14 The complaint questions whether LG's payments to Nelson were for *bona fide*
15 employment or were intended solely to supplement her smaller salary with the McCain
16 campaign. If the latter is true, then the McCain Committee would have received an excessive
17 in-kind contribution from LG. 2 U.S.C. § 441a. The complaint also raises a legitimate concern
18 over whether Nelson could have simultaneously worked as the Finance Director for a
19 presidential campaign and provided consulting services to another employer. However, the
20 response from the McCain Committee and other available information rebut these allegations,
21 and the Commission has found no information in the public record to contradict assertions that
22 Nelson did perform work for LG during the time period in question. The information available
23 to the Commission verifies that the payments to Nelson were for work she performed for the

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1 firm, that payments made to Nelson from August through December 2007 were part of a
2 severance package, and from January through April 2008, the payments were compensation for
3 her *bona fide* consulting services. The Commission, however, has not been provided with any
4 examples of projects on which Nelson consulted during this time. The McCain Committee also
5 indicates that it reviewed LG's consulting agreement with Nelson, and it relied on "express
6 statements" by LG that both the severance and consulting agreements with Nelson were
7 "consistent with and pursuant to [LG's] pre-existing severance policy and practices . . . in the
8 usual and ordinary course of LG's business and at commercially reasonable terms." McCain
9 Response at 2. Thus, there is no information to suggest that LG's payments to Nelson were not
10 for actual services she performed for the firm.

11 The complaint also draws attention to the size of the monthly payments LG made to
12 Nelson (\$15,000) compared with Nelson's monthly salary with the McCain campaign (\$6,300).
13 This fact alone does not suggest that LG's payments were not for *bona fide* consulting services
14 or in an amount greater than what would be paid to a similarly qualified individual for the same
15 type of work. In fact, it is not unusual for compensation in the private sector to be substantially
16 greater than payments made to campaign staff members. In the context of advisory opinion
17 requests, the Commission has permitted compensation plans that are tied to factors other than
18 billable hours, such as seniority, the ability to attract clients, and other skills. For instance, in
19 Advisory Opinion 2004-08 (American Sugar Cane League), the Commission found there was no
20 prohibited contribution where a corporation's severance package to a candidate was tied to past
21 employment services, based on objective considerations, and comparable to those packages
22 offered to similarly qualified employees. *See also* Advisory Opinion 2006-13 (Spivack)
23 (compensation paid to candidate did not constitute a contribution as long as it was in accordance

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1 with the firm's established compensation plan); Advisory Opinion 2004-17 (Klein)
2 (compensation for consulting services actually rendered was not a contribution if it satisfied
3 criteria in 11 C.F.R. § 113.1(g)); Advisory Opinion 1979-74 (Emerson) (compensation for
4 services that is comparable to amount paid to other similarly qualified persons for the same work
5 over the same period would not be a contribution). However, the Commission has been clear
6 over the years that where compensation is tied to billable hours, a contribution results when the
7 candidate's compensation is not reduced to reflect the actual hours worked. *See, e.g.,* Advisory
8 Opinion 2000-1 (Taveras); Advisory Opinion 1980-115 (O'Donnell); Advisory Opinion 1978-06
9 (Garr).

10 While there is no information about the salaries that other similarly qualified persons
11 would have received for the same work, 11 C.F.R. § 113.1(g)(6)(iii)(C), the available
12 information indicates how Tom Loeffler determined Nelson's salary payments for this time
13 period. It seems that Nelson's compensation was not tied to billable hours, but rather "on the
14 basis of [Loeffler's] 30 years experience as an employer with knowledge of the marketplace and
15 the true value of a person's professional services," and included factors such as seniority and
16 status within the firm, Nelson's ability to attract and retain clients, her skills, and her "value to
17 [LG] as an around-the-clock advisor." The information also shows that LG's severance
18 agreement was made in accordance with the firm's past practices, in the firm's "ordinary course
19 of business on terms substantially similar to those offered other employees in recognition of
20 bona fide work," and did not exceed an amount given to others in similar situations.

21 Although the available information indicates that Nelson's monthly payments during this
22 time period were less than her monthly salary when she worked full time for the firm, no
23 information has been provided to specify the amount of those monthly payments or Nelson's

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1 previous salary. Although the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 requires lobbying firms to
2 register their lobbyists and report the firm's income and expenditures, the firm is not required to
3 report individual lobbyists' salaries. According to news reports, however, lobbyists' salaries for
4 well-connected staff can start as high as \$300,000 a year. See Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, *The Road to*
5 *Riches is Called K Street*, WASH. POST, June 22, 2005, at A01. Previously, Nelson had been a
6 Principal at the firm, and had many years of professional fundraising and government affairs
7 consulting experience at the firm and previously with other organizations. According to
8 information obtained by the Commission, Loeffler relied heavily on Nelson during the time
9 period in question because three other "key personnel" had recently left the firm.

10 There is no information available to demonstrate that LG's payments to Nelson from
11 August 2007 through April 2008 were inappropriate. The information available to the
12 Commission indicates that the payments were tied to Nelson's consulting services actually
13 rendered to LG, that LG had a past business practice of offering severance packages to departing
14 employees, that it followed such practice in offering Nelson a severance package, that Nelson's
15 payments were tied to factors other than billable hours, and that they were less than her prior
16 full-time salary. 11 C.F.R. § 113.1(g)(6)(iii). The complaint fails to provide any specific
17 information that would contradict these assertions.

18 Even though the McCain Committee's response appears to rebut the speculative
19 allegations in the complaint, some questions remain regarding how much work Nelson actually
20 performed for the firm. The Commission obtained general information that Nelson's
21 compensation did not exceed the amount that would have been given to others in a similar
22 situation, but has no specific examples in support. In similar cases, the Commission has weighed
23 the information in the complaint and responses when determining whether to proceed with an

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1 investigation. In MUR 5736 (Friends for Mike McGavick), for instance, the Commission found
2 that while the responses to the complaint were not factually complete, the complaint, which
3 alleged that the candidate's employer altered the terms of his employment agreement that in turn
4 resulted in lucrative benefits for the candidate, failed to provide sufficient facts to warrant an
5 investigation. See MUR 5736, First General Counsel's Report dated Nov. 22, 2006. In that
6 matter, the Respondents explained that the candidate's employment agreement was converted to
7 a severance package in the ordinary course of business and included payments for services
8 McGavick was to provide during the company's transition to a new CEO. *Id.* at 3-5. Moreover,
9 there was no information available to indicate that McGavick did not perform *bona fide* work for
10 the corporation during the transition or that he was paid more than other departing executives.
11 *Id.* at 10; see also, MUR 5701 (Bob Filner for Congress), First General Counsel's Report, dated
12 July 10, 2006, at 5 (finding allegations and available information did not warrant an investigation
13 where the respondent provided "sufficient and specific facts to rebut the complainant's
14 allegations" that a business run by the candidate's spouse was a "sham"). In the *Filner* matter,
15 there was also no information presented to contradict the Respondents' contentions that *bona*
16 *fide* services were provided to the campaign committee and that the company was paid fair
17 market value for the work. *Id.*

18 Similarly, while the response from the McCain Committee in this matter does not provide
19 substantial details regarding the arrangements with Nelson, the allegations in the complaint lack
20 sufficient facts to contradict the representations made in the McCain Committee's response and
21 other available information. See Statement of Reasons of Commissioners David M. Mason, Karl
22 J. Sandstrom, Bradley A. Smith and Scott E. Thomas in MUR 4960 (Hillary Rodham Clinton for
23 US Senate Exploratory Committee), issued December 21, 2000 (stating that "a complaint may be

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1 dismissed if it consists of factual allegations that are refuted with sufficiently compelling
2 evidence provided in the response to the complaint”).

3 Accordingly, the Commission finds no reason to believe that John McCain 2008, Inc. and
4 Joseph Schmuckler, in his official capacity as treasurer violated 2 U.S.C. § 441a in connection
5 with the allegations relating to payments that LG made to Nelson.

6 **B. 3EDC, LLC**

7 **1. Factual Background**

8 The McCain campaign hired 3eDC, a company partly owned by McCain campaign
9 manager Rick Davis, to develop and maintain the campaign’s website. 3eDC provided those
10 services, which included website development, e-mail list building, social networking tools, and
11 database management from January through May 2007. The complaint alleges that 3eDC
12 reduced its bill for Web services provided to the McCain campaign by \$107,475 at a time when
13 the campaign was struggling financially and attempting to cut costs, resulting in a prohibited
14 corporate contribution under 2 U.S.C. § 441b and 11 C.F.R. § 100.55. The complaint refers to
15 public statements by the McCain campaign that there were billing errors and that the bill was
16 renegotiated. However, the complaint questions how “a campaign manager can renegotiate a
17 contract with a firm that he partly owns without at least the appearance that he has used his
18 influence with both parties to reduce the debt.” Complaint at 6.

19 A number of press articles report that Rick Davis arranged for the campaign’s initial
20 service contract with the vendor, 3eDC, and that the contract with 3eDC “initially brought
21 objections from top [McCain] advisers,” with some individuals accusing Davis of “self-dealing.”
22 Michael Cooper, *Savior or Machiavelli - McCain’s Top Aide Carries On*, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23,
23 2007, at A26; Matthew Mosk, *Top McCain Adviser has Found Success Mixing Money, Politics*,

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1 WASHINGTON POST, June 26, 2008, at A01. However, the McCain Committee claims that Davis
2 was not involved in negotiating the initial contract or in any other discussions concerning 3eDC.
3 Information obtained by the Commission indicates that Davis was "only a passive investor in
4 3eDC," and not involved in the day-to-day operations. The McCain Committee also states that
5 Davis recused himself from any involvement with 3eDC while working for the McCain
6 campaign. McCain Response at 1 and Attachment A, ¶ 4. There is conflicting publicly available
7 information, however, on whether Davis disclosed his financial interest in 3eDC to McCain early
8 in the campaign. Cooper, *supra* at A26; Edward T. Pound, *Troublesome Resumes*, U.S. NEWS &
9 WORLD REPORT, May 28, 2007, at 50.

10 The McCain Committee's response and other available information explain that there
11 was a legitimate dispute regarding the amount the campaign owed to 3eDC. 3eDC and the
12 McCain campaign entered into a contract for services on January 26, 2007. The contract details
13 3eDC's fee structure for its services to the McCain Committee, including base fees, hourly rates
14 for additional work, and administrative fees. In May 2007, 3eDC decided to invoke the
15 contract's termination clause because the campaign had failed to pay two outstanding invoices
16 when they were due, which 3eDC considered to be a material breach of the agreement. Initially,
17 3eDC sent a letter, dated May 11, 2007, to the McCain Committee requesting that it pay
18 \$164,138.21, the total owed on those invoices, in order to cure the material breach. The parties
19 discussed the matter and decided to terminate the service agreement. They entered into a
20 Termination Agreement and Release ("Termination Agreement"), dated May 18, 2007, that
21 required payment of the overdue invoices totaling \$164,138.21, required 3eDC to deliver a Final
22 Statement of unpaid services to the campaign by May 25, 2007, included a provision providing
23 for accrual of 1% interest per month for amounts that were past due, and required the campaign

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1 to make full payment, plus interest, within 60 days of receipt of the Final Statement. The
2 Termination Agreement estimated that the remaining invoices to be included in the Final
3 Statement totaled approximately \$725,000. The McCain campaign paid \$164,138.21 upon
4 execution of the agreement on May 18, 2007.

5 According to the McCain Committee, 3eDC never delivered a "Final Statement" to the
6 campaign, but instead "revised and confirmed the existing pending invoices." See McCain
7 Response at Attachment B, page 4. Nevertheless, before the sixty-day deadline, the McCain
8 Committee sent a letter dated July 16, 2007, invoking an "Audit" provision from the Services
9 and License Agreement that allowed the campaign to conduct a review and analysis of the
10 vendor's records supporting the fees and expenses invoiced by 3eDC. McCain Response at 1
11 and Attachment 6 (Letter to 3eDC). The McCain Committee explains that it also began its
12 review in response to news reports alleging that Rick Davis personally benefitted from the
13 committee's contract with 3eDC. *Id.* at Attachment A, ¶¶ 2-3.

14 Upon completing its review, the McCain Committee submitted a seven-page summary to
15 3eDC, dated September 10, 2007, that proposed adjustments for fees that it believed were in
16 error or where it believed there was insufficient documentation to support the expenses, and
17 proposed to pay a total of \$585,001.83 to settle the debt. The McCain Committee's letter
18 provides a detailed account of the disputed invoice amounts. The McCain Committee has also
19 provided to the Commission a copy of its internal written summary of its 3eDC account.
20 McCain Committee at Attachment B. Specifically, the Committee proposed a reduction in
21 3eDC's hosting charges by \$22,022.42; in Internet advertising by \$42,341.34; and website
22 content and development by \$63,119.24. *Id.* During the course of its review, the campaign also

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1 identified adjustments in 3eDC's favor, which it credited to 3eDC. *Id.* at 1-2. In total, the
2 McCain Committee proposed a reduction of approximately \$127,483.

3 Available information indicates that while 3eDC did not agree with all of the
4 adjustments, it believed that the proposal was commercially reasonable and agreed to accept the
5 committee's proposal, subject to some additional terms. McCain Response at Attachment C.
6 Those terms included required interest payments of 6% a year, monthly installments, a payment
7 schedule, late fees of 1% per month, an acceleration clause if the campaign ceased operating
8 before December 1, 2008, and required that the McCain Committee not seek reimbursement for
9 the cost of its audit. 3eDC believed that accepting the campaign's proposal, along with the
10 additional terms, was commercially reasonable and the best course of action to "resolve the
11 matter in order to get paid." According to information obtained by the Commission, 3eDC
12 balanced the costs of potential litigation, which would also result in more time passing without
13 receiving payments from the campaign, compared with the relatively small amount involved.
14 Based on those considerations, settling the matter at the reduced amount proposed made the most
15 "financial sense." Ultimately in September 2007, both parties agreed to these terms, which
16 required 15 monthly payments that would end on December 25, 2008. McCain Response at 2.
17 According to the McCain Committee, all required monthly payments were made to 3eDC
18 pursuant to the parties' negotiated resolution, and the full amount was paid several months early.
19 McCain Response at Attachment A, ¶ 8.

20 **2. Legal Analysis**

21 The Act prohibits corporations from making contributions in connection with federal
22 elections. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a); 11 C.F.R. § 114.2(b)(1). As a limited liability company, 3eDC
23 may be subject to the prohibition against corporate contributions, depending on whether it elects

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1 to be treated as a partnership or corporation by the Internal Revenue Service. 11 C.F.R.
2 § 110.1(g). If treated as a partnership, it is possible that 3eDC made an excessive in-kind
3 contribution to the McCain Committee in violation of 2 U.S.C. § 441a when it reduced the
4 committee's debt as that reduction was well in excess of the maximum contribution of \$2,300
5 per partner as allowed by law. 11 C.F.R. § 110.1(e). If 3eDC elected tax treatment as a
6 corporation, it may have made a corporate contribution in violation of 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) if its
7 agreement with the McCain Committee was not commercially reasonable. Information
8 regarding 3eDC's tax election is not publicly available. Therefore, it is unclear whether 3eDC is
9 subject to the prohibition against corporate contributions or the contribution limits applicable to
10 partnerships. 11 C.F.R. § 110.1(g). Nonetheless, it is not necessary to investigate 3eDC's tax
11 status because the Commission concludes that the agreement was commercially reasonable and
12 thus, there is no reason to believe there is a violation of either section 441a or 441b, as explained
13 below.

14 The allegations in the complaint raise the question whether 3eDC's reduction of its bill of
15 services to the McCain Committee by \$127,483 was commercially reasonable. Commission
16 regulations provide that a commercial vendor may forgive or settle a debt for less than the full
17 amount owed or may resolve a disputed debt, if it has treated the debt in a commercially
18 reasonable manner and complied with the regulatory requirements in 11 C.F.R. §§ 116.4 and
19 116.10. "Commercial vendor" is defined as "any persons providing goods or services to a
20 candidate or political committee whose usual and normal business involves the sale, rental, lease,
21 or provision of those services." 11 C.F.R. § 116.1(c). For unincorporated vendors, such as
22 3eDC, the amount forgiven is not considered a contribution if the commercial vendor has treated
23 the debt in a commercially reasonable manner and satisfied the relevant requirements of

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1 11 C.F.R. § 116.7 or 116.8. *Id.* at 116.4(a). A vendor can demonstrate that it has treated a debt
2 in a commercially reasonable manner by showing that: (1) the original extension of credit was
3 proper pursuant to 11 C.F.R. § 116.3; (2) the committee has undertaken all reasonable efforts to
4 satisfy the outstanding debt, such as engaging in additional fundraising, reducing overhead and
5 administrative costs, or liquidating assets; and (3) that the vendor has pursued its remedies as
6 vigorously as it would pursue its remedies against a similarly situated non-political debtor, *i.e.*,
7 that it has made oral and written requests for payment, withheld delivery of goods or services
8 until overdue debts are satisfied, imposed additional charges for late payment, referred the debt
9 to a collection service, or litigated for payment on the debt. 11 C.F.R. § 116.4(d).

10 Ongoing committees may resolve disputed debts, but the parties must nevertheless treat a
11 disputed debt in a "commercially reasonable manner" in accordance with 11 C.F.R. § 116.4(a)
12 and (d). A disputed debt, defined as an actual or potential debt or obligation where there is a
13 *bona fide* disagreement between the creditor and the political committee as to the existence of
14 the debt or the amount owed, is not subject to the debt settlement requirements and procedures
15 set forth in 11 C.F.R. §§ 116.7 and 116.8. *See* 11 C.F.R. §§ 116.1(d) and 116.7(c)(2).

16 Commission regulations also state that a commercial vendor may extend credit to a
17 candidate or political committee, provided that the extension of credit is in the ordinary course of
18 the vendor's business practices and that the terms of the credit are substantially similar to
19 extensions of credit to non-political entities, and they further provide that an extension of credit
20 includes agreements between a vendor and political committee providing additional time to pay
21 an amount due or the failure of the committee to make full payment by the previously agreed
22 upon due date. 11 C.F.R. §§ 116.1(e) and 116.3(a).

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1 Here, the complaint questions the circumstances surrounding the negotiation of the debt
2 the McCain Committee owed to 3eDC. Both 3eDC and the McCain Committee assert that they
3 had a *bona fide* dispute regarding the amount that the campaign owed and add that the reduction
4 that was ultimately negotiated was commercially reasonable. As discussed below, there is no
5 information to contradict those contentions.

6 First, there is no information to indicate that the original service contract between 3eDC
7 and the campaign, or that their negotiations concerning the amount owed by the campaign, was
8 not proper pursuant 11 C.F.R. § 116.3(c). See 11 C.F.R. § 116.4(d)(1). The complaint provides
9 no information to demonstrate that 3eDC deviated from its established procedures and past
10 practices in any of its arrangements with the campaign. *Id.* at § 116.3(c)(1). While there is no
11 specific information to demonstrate that 3eDC's actions in re-negotiating the fees with the
12 Committee followed the company's established procedures, whether the transaction "conformed
13 to the usual and normal practice in the commercial vendor's trade or industry," or if it was on the
14 same terms as those provided to non-political clients, as required by 11 C.F.R. § 116.3(c)(1)-(3),
15 the McCain Committee has provided the Commission with substantial documentation to show
16 that it negotiated a reasonable resolution of a commercial dispute with 3eDC. As part of the
17 response to the complaint, the Committee provided thorough documentation regarding the initial
18 service contract, correspondence with each other concerning termination of the contract and
19 negotiation of the debt, and included a sworn affidavit describing the circumstances behind the
20 negotiations. In addition, the McCain Committee provided lengthy documentation containing
21 the results of its line item review of its account with 3eDC. See McCain Response at Attachment
22 B (providing fifteen-page redacted internal memorandum to Commission). Further, the
23 documentation demonstrates that the McCain Committee and 3eDC followed procedures

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1 established in those agreements in order to terminate the contract, review invoices, and resolve
2 disputed amounts due.

3 Second, the McCain Committee's efforts to satisfy the outstanding debt were reasonable.
4 11 C.F.R. § 116.4(d)(2). As part of its efforts to resolve the outstanding debt, the McCain
5 Committee invoked the "Audit" provision from the Services and License Agreement, before the
6 sixty-day deadline for payment of the final invoices totaling approximately \$725,000, and
7 completed a review of 3eDC's records pertaining to the Committee's account that led to the
8 eventual reduction of the 3eDC's bill to the Committee. Although section 116.4(d)(2) lists other
9 efforts that can indicate reasonableness, such as engaging in further fundraising efforts, the
10 regulation states that the examples set forth therein are not an exhaustive list. In this matter, the
11 Committee's prompt and thorough review of 3eDC's records suggests that the McCain
12 Committee took reasonable steps to ascertain the correct amount due to the vendor and then paid
13 the amount ahead of schedule. The Committee's actions in accepting the additional terms
14 proposed by 3eDC to settle the debt also support this conclusion.

15 Although section 116.4(d)(2) requires that a committee undertake all reasonable efforts to
16 satisfy the outstanding debt, the McCain Committee did not admit that anything more than
17 \$585,001.83 was due on the contract, and it paid that amount. 3eDC may not have initially
18 agreed with that figure, but it accepted the results of the McCain Committee's audit. Thus, the
19 requirement that the McCain Committee use "all" reasonable efforts is satisfied in this case.

20 Finally, the information available supports a finding that 3eDC pursued its remedies as
21 vigorously as it would pursue its remedies against a nonpolitical debtor in similar circumstances.
22 11 C.F.R. § 116.4(d)(3). In response to the McCain Committee's failure to pay two invoices,
23 3eDC sought to terminate the service contract and sent a written request for payment. *Id.* at

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1 § 116.4(d)(3)(i). In addition, upon receipt of the McCain Committee's written summary
2 proposing adjustments to 3eDC's fees, 3eDC proposed additional terms including interest
3 payments, a payment schedule and late fees. *Id.* at § 116.4(d)(3)(iii). While 3eDC chose not to
4 pursue litigation or refer the McCain Committee's debt to a debt collection service as suggested
5 in the non-exhaustive list found in the Commission's regulations, it appears that the cost of
6 litigation was one of 3eDC's considerations in deciding to settle the matter for the amount
7 proposed by the campaign. 11 C.F.R. § 116.4(d)(3)(iv) and (v). 3eDC's business decision to
8 settle the Committee's debt for the bulk of the amount owed, plus interest payments and late
9 fees, rather than spend additional funds in hopes of obtaining an amount closer to \$725,000, does
10 not appear unreasonable.

11 Thus, the documentation available to the Commission lends support to the contention that
12 the reduction of the McCain Committee's bill was done in a commercially reasonable manner.
13 As discussed above, the documentation also accounts for the time that passed between the
14 termination of the service contract and the campaign's payment of the amount owed to 3eDC.
15 In past cases in which the Commission determined that in-kind contributions resulted, the cases
16 involved long delays in payment that did not appear commercially reasonable. *See* MUR 5396
17 (Bauer for President 2000) (respondents entered into conciliation agreement to resolve, *inter*
18 *alia*, 441a and 441b violations resulting from extensions of credit from three different vendors
19 totaling over \$700,000 and owed for periods between 105 to 235 days); MUR 5047
20 (Clinton/Gore '96) (the Commission found reason to believe that the committee and two of its
21 vendors violated section 441b by accepting or making illegal corporate extensions of credit
22 totaling over \$900,000 that were unresolved for four months or longer, but took no further action
23 because the debts had been paid in full and some debt collection activity had occurred).

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1 In this matter, the McCain Committee and 3eDC negotiated a termination agreement
2 within 7 days of 3eDC's notification of the campaign's material breach of the contract. The
3 Committee's audit of 3eDC's records then lasted almost two months, from July to September
4 2007. However, upon completion of the audit, the campaign sent a detailed summary to 3eDC
5 proposing adjustments in the invoices, and within a few days, the parties negotiated a final
6 agreement for payment of the remaining amount due to 3eDC, that included a payment schedule,
7 interest payments and late fees. The campaign immediately started the required payments in
8 October 2007 and paid the debt off early.

9 Because the dispute over the amount owed was resolved over the course of two months,
10 between the deadlines for the 2007 July and October Quarterly Reports, the McCain Committee
11 was not required to report the debt owed to 3eDC as a "disputed debt." 11 C.F.R. § 116.10. It
12 appears that the McCain Committee properly reported its debt owed to 3eDC in its reports filed
13 with the Commission, by reporting the amount of the debt it ultimately agreed on with 3eDC.
14 2 U.S.C. § 434(b)(8).

15 Accordingly, the Commission finds no reason to believe that John McCain 2008, Inc. and
16 Joseph Schmuckler, in his official capacity as treasurer, violated 2 U.S.C. §§ 434(b), 441a or
17 441b.

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